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Abstract
How can we explain what we might want to term the “German savings puzzle”? Ger-
many has one of the most generous public pension and health insurance systems of the
world, yet private savings are high until old age. Savings remain positive in old age, even
for most low income households.
We provide a complicated answer that combines historical facts with capital market im-
perfections, housing, tax and pension policies. The first part of the paper describes how
German households save, based on a synthetic panel of four cross sections of the Ger-
man Income and Expenditure Survey ("Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben") col-
lected between 1978 and 1993. The second part links saving behavior with public policy,
notably tax and pension policy.
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1The German Savings Puzzle
by Axel Börsch-Supan, Anette Reil-Held, Ralf Rodepeter, Reinhold Schnabel,
and Joachim Winter
Introduction
This paper describes how German households save and why the observed savings patterns
might have emerged. In the descriptive part of the paper, we present cross sectional and lon-
gitudinal patterns of household saving. We then explain why these saving patterns are likely to
have strongly been influenced by public policies. These policies include capital taxation and
subsidies to specific forms of saving, and, most notably, pension policies.
We face a “German savings puzzle”: Germany has one of the most generous public pension
and health insurance systems of the world, yet private savings are high until old age. We pro-
vide a complicated answer to the questions raised by that puzzle, combining historical facts
with capital market imperfections, housing, tax and pension policies.
The paper is a brief version of the German country chapter in Börsch-Supan (2001). The
reader is referred to this volume for details on methodology and results. This summary paper is
set up as follows: Section 1 briefly describes our data sources. Section 2 presents cross-
sectional and longitudinal profiles of various saving measures by age and birth cohort. Section
3 looks at financial, real and pension wealth. Section 4 links the observed saving and wealth
patterns to public policy.
1. Data
We base our description of savings behavior in Germany on four cross sections of the German
Income and Expenditure Survey ("Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben," EVS). The EVS
is collected every five years by the German Bureau of the Census.1  The design roughly corre-
sponds to that of the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey.  The surveys include a very detailed
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 Descriptive analyses of household wealth have been carried out by the German Bureau of the Census (Euler,
1985, 1990; Guttmann, 1995). The 1978-1988 surveys have been analyzed with respect to household savings by
Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991), Velling (1991), Lang (1997), and Börsch-Supan (1992, 1994).
2account of income by source, consumption by type, saving flows, and asset stocks by portfolio
category. As opposed to earlier waves, the 1993 wave also includes the new states in East
Germany, and foreign residents in West Germany. For comparability reasons, we will restrict
our analysis to the subsample of West Germans.
The surveys are representative of all households with annual gross incomes below DM
300,000. They include about 45,000 households in each wave.  These large sample sizes pro-
vide for sufficiently large cell sizes in each age category, even for old ages. The data exclude
the very wealthy households and the institutionalized population.  The former represent about
two percent of households. For this reason, the data cannot be expected to add up to national
accounting figures. For example, aggregating household savings in the EVS 1983 yields a net
private saving rate of 12.0 percent while the corresponding figure reported by the Deutsche
Bundesbank is 13.6 percent.2 Omission of the institutionalized is serious only among the very
old.  Although less than four percent of all persons aged 65 and more in Germany are institu-
tionalized, this percentage increases rapidly with age and is estimated to be about 9.3 percent
of all persons aged 80 and more.  Elderly in institutions are more likely to have few assets and
no savings.
Households in the EVS cross sections are not necessarily the same and cannot be matched.  It
is therefore impossible to construct a panel of individuals. This would be most desirable for the
identification of life-cycle saving behavior and the separation of age and cohort effects. In lack
of longitudinal data on savings behavior in Germany, we resort to the construction of a syn-
thetic panel. We aggregate the cross sectional data into age categories and identify adjacent
age groups across waves. The large sample sizes are of considerable help for the synthetic co-
hort approach because aggregation units can be defined sufficiently narrow to assure homoge-
neity without a major loss of statistical precision.
2. Saving by age and birth cohorts
The data permit two measurements of savings.3  The first measure is computed as the sum of
purchases of assets minus sales of assets. Changes in financial assets reported in the EVS are
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 This divergence is due to two differences in the base: The EVS omit the upper 2 percent of the income distri-
bution while the Bundesbank also includes non-profit organizations.
3
 See the full version of this paper (Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter, 2001) for details
3deposits to and withdrawals from the various kinds of savings accounts; purchases and sales of
stocks and bonds; deposits to and withdrawals from dedicated savings accounts at building
societies ("Bausparkassen") which are an important savings component in Germany; and con-
tributions to life insurances and private pension plans minus payments received.  New loans are
subtracted and repayments are added to net savings.  Not reported are changes in cash and
checking accounts.  Changes in real assets reported in the EVS are purchases and sales of real
estate and business partnerships.  Not reliably reported are changes in durables (other than real
estate).  Unrealized capital gains remain unreported.  To arrive at saving rates, household sav-
ing is divided by disposable household income, consisting of labor, asset, and transfer income
minus taxes and social security contributions.
The second definition is the residual of income minus consumption.  We will show that both
definitions are very close on average although there is substantial discrepancy for some house-
holds. A third definition, the difference between initial and end of period stocks of wealth, can-
not be computed from the data since stocks are measured only once in each wave. Following
the definitions in the introductory paper of this journal issue, we distinguish among discretion-
ary saving, composed of real and financial saving, mandatory saving to funded pension plans,
and “notional saving”, the mandatory contributions to unfunded social security systems.
Discretionary Saving
Figure 1 shows mean total discretionary saving by age in the four cross sections 1978-1993.
On the vertical axis, amounts are in DM per year. We use the consumer price index to convert
all amounts to 1993 purchasing power.4  On the horizontal axis, we have age, generally in five
year intervals. Each age category also represents a cohort, and comparing points on one of the
cross sectional lines drawn in Figure 1 compares households that are simultaneously in differ-
ent age categories and cohorts.
The shapes are roughly similar. Changes across years are far from a simple shift of each profile:
for the younger age groups, 1978 and 1993 were the years with the highest saving, while there
is less of a clear picture for the older ones. There are two main features. First, saving exhibits a
                                                                                                                                                  
on data sources, definitions for the variables used in this paper, and an inventory of measurement problems
together with our preferred solutions. It also provides an electronic appendix with all data in spreadsheet form.
4
 1 DM in 1993 has a purchasing power of about 0,57 Euro (• ) in 1999.
4hump shape, reaching a peak at the age/cohort group around age 45. Second, saving remains
positive, even in old age.
Figure 1: Mean Discretionary Saving in 1978-1993
These features are astoundingly similar for all income groups except the lower income quarter
of the German households, see Figure 2. Median and mean saving have the same hump shape
as Figure 1, and remain positive for all age groups, except for the lower quartile.
Figure 2: Mean and Median Discretionary Saving in 1993
While Figures 1 and 2 were calculated as purchases minus sales of assets during one calendar
year, the EVS also permits the computation of a second savings measure, namely the residual
from subtracting all consumption expenditures from disposable income.5 Figure 3 depicts the
comparison of both measures and shows that our saving measure is robust. The figure also
gives an impression of the sampling error of our saving measure which is relatively small due to
the large cell sizes.
Figure 3: Mean Discretionary Saving by Two Different Definitions, 1993
The first measure is almost always within the 2σ-confidence bands of the second measure.
Using confidence bands for both measures, the difference is not significant. This is an impor-
tant result as it strengthens the belief in the internal consistency of the data, even though there
are some large departures from coincidence for a few households which are masked by the
averages depicted in Figure 3.
Figures 1-3 display cross-sectional variation across age/cohort-groups and do not identify life-
cycle changes. In order to do understand life-cycle behavior, we need to follow households
over time. As pointed out in Section 1, we lack longitudinal data on savings in Germany and
therefore combine the data of the available four EVS cross-sections from 1978 to 1993 to a
synthetic panel of household groups. Figure 4 displays cohort-specific age savings profiles
from this synthetic panel under the identifying assumption that time effects are zero, starting at
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 Disposable income is gross income minus direct taxes and contributions to mandatory social security systems.
Consumption expenditures are reported very detailed in the EVS, based on weekly diaries. For precise defini-
tions see Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter (2001).
5the left side with the youngest cohort in our data, born between 1954 and 1958, and procee-
ding to the oldest cohort, born between 1909 and 1913.6  Saving increases until it reaches a
peak in the age range 45-49, then declines until the age group of the 65-69 old. It then remains
essentially flat. As pointed out before, saving remains positive even in old age.
Figure 4: Mean Discretionary Saving by Cohort
The life-cycle pattern in saving visible in Figure 4 has two components: the hump-shaped pat-
tern of disposable household income,7 and the relatively flat pattern of saving rates to which
we turn now.
Saving Rates
Because mean saving rates are very sensitive to changes in nominator and denominator, we
focus on the median and quartile saving rates in each age category. We only show the 1993
cross section since the others have a very similar same shape. Figure 5 shows that the
age/cohort pattern is rather stable across income quartiles. The differences (pronounced hump
shape for the richer, fairly flat for the poorer households) are thus mainly due to differences in
income profiles.  The increase in saving rates in very old age is interesting. Remember, how-
ever, that the data only covers households, not elderly in institutions. Thus, the sample selects
those who are less likely to dissave. A back-on-the-envelope calculation (Börsch-Supan, 1992)
shows that this selection effect by itself is unlikely to explain the high saving rates in old age,
although a precise analysis cannot be done without genuine longitudinal data.
Figure 5: Median Saving Rates, 1993 Cross Section
If we combine the data visible in Figure 5 with the other waves and disentangle age and cohort
effects, we obtain the life-cycle profiles of Figure 6. Saving rates are fairly stable and around
12% for all young and middle-aged groups until around age 45-49. They then decline and sta-
bilize around age 65-69, when they remain at about 4%.8
Figure 6: Median Saving Rates by Cohort
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 Identifying assumptions in genuine and synthetic panels (Deaton, 1985) are discussed by Brugiavini and
Weber (2001).
7
 Displayed in Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter (2001).
8
 The data suggests an increase for the 1988 wave for all older cohorts. We have no satisfactory explanation for
this effect, particularly, because the pension level decreased between 1983 and 1988.
6Composition of Saving: Real and Financial Saving
The regular hump shape pattern of discretionary saving masks an important compositional shift
between its two components, real and financial saving.
We begin with real saving, depicted in Figure 7. It mainly consists of purchases minus sales of
owner-occupied housing, including a correction for upkeep and depreciation, and subtracts
applicable mortgage payments.9 Figure 7 shows the four cross sections of real saving, 1978-
1993.  Because homeownership in Germany is only about 40 percent, much lower than in most
other countries, the median is mostly zero and not shown. The means depicted in Figure 7
quickly reach a sizable magnitude for the age/cohort groups around age 35 and then decline.
There is substantial dissaving for the older age groups, mainly due to depreciation without off-
setting upkeep, since mobility is very low.
Figure 7: Mean Real Saving, 1978-1993
A large part of the quick increase in real savings appears to be financed by the withdrawal of
financial assets for the purpose of down payments. This is suggested by Figure 8 where the
means turn negative among the age/cohort groups between age 25 and 35.10
Figure 8: Mean Financial Saving, 1978-1993
This argument is strengthened by the striking difference between mean and median saving visi-
ble in Figure 9 which shows details of financial saving in the 1993 wave. While homeownership
is relatively low in Germany, down payments are typically large, around a third of total home
and land value. Hence, this affects the median much less than the mean. Financial saving is
positive even for those households that are age 70 and older.
Figure 9: Mean and Median Financial Saving in 1993
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 Other real wealth is less well measured. For example, the EVS data do not permit a sensible measurement of
changes in wealth that is invested in business partnerships.  This does affect only some households in a large
way but not the average. See Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter (2001). We also do not
have the regional information necessary to impute capital gains in housing which were large in some places
such as Munich.
10
 Our measure of financial saving includes the conventional financial saving categories, includes consumer
loans, but excludes mortgages as well as capital gains or losses. Capital gains to the consumer have been small
in Germany relative to the UK and the US, see Börsch-Supan and Eymann (2000).
7Mandatory Saving
Mandatory contributions to public funded pension plans are negligible in Germany. Only a mi-
nority of civil servants are required to contribute a small percentage of their salary increases to
funds that are effectively invested in government bonds. The contributions amount to roughly
0,5% of salary.
Contributions to private pension plans are not negligible in Germany, but they are much smaller
than, e.g., in the Netherlands or in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Slightly more than 50% of
workers are covered by a firm pension at least part of their career, but these pensions are small
and provide only about 6 percent of total average retirement income. In many cases, these pen-
sion plans are mandatory in the sense that they come as a package deal with the employment
contract and offer no opting-out possibility.
Because mandatory occupational pensions play such a small role in Germany, the related sav-
ing flows have been subsumed in the discretionary saving category discussed earlier.
“Notional saving:” Mandatory contributions to pay-as-you-go systems
Germany has very large pay-as-you-go systems that finance old age and health care. Almost all
dependent employees and their employers must contribute to the German public retirement
insurance. As pointed out in the introductory paper of this journal issue, these contributions are
not saving in a narrow sense. However, they are a functional equivalent of saving and thus a
potentially important determinant for discretionary saving. We will discuss this extensively in
Section 4.
The contribution rate to the public retirement insurance is 19.3% of gross earnings.11  In addi-
tion, an estimated 8.5% of gross earnings is levied indirectly via other taxes, mainly V.A.T. and
the new ecology tax. The contribution base for public pension contributions is capped at about
1.8 times the average earnings. No opting out is possible. High wage earners therefore pay a
lower percentage of their income and receive a correspondingly lower replacement rate.
The contributions add up to a claim on public pensions that is substantial when compared to
actual financial and real wealth. We turn to this point in the following section on wealth.
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 More precisely: Gross earnings include net earnings, income taxes and the employee’s share (one half) of
social security contributions. Total labor compensation includes gross earnings as defined plus the second half
8The branches of the German social insurance system also include health, long-term care, and
unemployment insurance. For the average worker, the contributions to these branches add up
to another 21 percent of gross income.12 The tax base is capped at about 1.6 times the average
earnings. Workers above this threshold can opt out of the public health and long-term care
insurance.
In sum, these social insurance contributions by far exceed discretionary savings for all depend-
ent employees below the earnings cap – about 85 percent of all workers.
3. Wealth by age and birth cohort
The EVS also provide data on the stocks of financial, real and total discretionary wealth in a
separate interview at the end of each survey year. We use these data to cross check our finding
on saving flows and to obtain a picture of what has been accumulated at retirement.
Discretionary real and financial wealth
Figure 10 depicts total discretionary wealth, defined in accordance to the flow measure of dis-
cretionary saving in Section 2, and arranged by cohorts using the synthetic panel approach
described earlier. It consists of gross financial and real wealth, minus outstanding consumer
loans and mortgages.
We see that total discretionary wealth increases until late in life, and there is only a brief (and
statistically insignificant) indication of a flat episode for the 1909 and 1914 cohorts, and even
there the change between the first and the last observation is positive.
Figure 10: Mean Total Discretionary Wealth by Cohort
West German private households possessed an average total wealth of DM 245,000 (•
122,000). At the time of the head’s retirement an average German household owned around
DM 275,000 (•  138,000) of total wealth in 1993. This is 12.5 times the public pension of an
average employee with 45 years of service in 1993 (net DM 22,000, •  11,000). The median
wealth at that age is DM 200,000, (•  100,000) which is lower than the mean but still relatively
high. Thus, it could quite substantially contribute to consumption (Schnabel, 1999). Neverthe-
                                                                                                                                                  
of social security contributions, the so-called employer’s share.
12
 See previous footnote.
9less, accumulation of even more wealth in the form of financial wealth takes place on average
in old age, as was illustrated in the savings profiles presented earlier. This is a surprising de-
parture from the life-cycle hypothesis.
The largest part of total discretionary wealth is real estate, in particular owner-occupied hous-
ing, compare Figures 11 and 12. For the group aged 30 to 59, real wealth makes 80 to 90 per-
cent of total wealth. Mean gross real wealth increased substantially from 1978 to 1993. A more
detailed analysis shows that this is mainly caused by an increase in homeownership from cohort
to cohort, while ownership rates remained essentially constant with increasing age after age 60
for any given cohort (Schnabel, 1999).
Figure 11: Mean Gross Real Estate Wealth, 1978–1993
Financial wealth increased by 38 percent between 1978 and 1993. This increase was mainly
caused by a wealth expansion of middle age classes. The expansion of financial wealth is strik-
ing between 1988 and 1993. The reason is a large increase in securities ownership for all age
classes.
Figure 12: Mean Gross Financial Wealth, 1978–1993
Pension wealth
The life-cycle pattern of discretionary wealth in Germany – almost always increasing, at most
flat – is in contrast to the hump shaped pattern of unfunded (“notional”) pension wealth that
trivially emerges from the sequence of first paying pension contributions and then receiving
pension benefits. Figure 13 shows how notional pension wealth builds up and is drawn down in
a synthetic life cycle. The representative worker underlying this simulation has an earnings
history of the average age-specific wage between ages 20 and 60, then retires at the average
retirement age and draws the statutory pension benefits. Notional pension wealth SSW at time t
is then computed as13
SSW(t) = (1+rho)*SSW(t-1) + contributions(t) – benefits(t)
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 See Brugiavini and Weber (2001) for a discussion of this measure.
10
where rho is the internal rate of return that equalizes the present value of contributions and
benefits for the above 40-year contribution history and a duration of benefits corresponding to
average life expectancy. At retirement, notional pension wealth of the representative worker is
about DM 400,000, 30 percent more than the sum of average financial and real wealth shown
in Figure 11. By definition, notional pension wealth is drawn down after age 60 and becomes
negative after age 78, average life expectancy, see Figure 13. In contrast, financial and real
wealth increases until age 70 for the 1919 cohort (see Figure 10), and increases between age
60 (65) and age 75 (80) for the 1914 (1909) cohort. This contrast is not by chance. Rather, it
reflects the influence of pension policies on discretionary saving. This is the main argument of
the following section.
Figure 13: Life-Cycle Build-up of Notional Pension Wealth
4. Saving Patterns and Public Policy
We can summarize the observed saving patterns in the following four points:
♦ Saving rates are high and stable until around age 45-49.
♦ Saving is lower but still positive even in old age. There is depreciation drawing down real
wealth, but virtually no signs of drawing down financial wealth.
♦ Until age 35, saving is mainly invested in owner-occupied housing, while it is mainly finan-
cial saving at older ages.
♦ At retirement, “notional” pension wealth provided by the pay-as-you-go social insurance
system is larger than real wealth and much larger than financial wealth.
These observations pose a host of questions: How can we explain a life-cycle profile of discre-
tionary household saving in Germany which is much flatter than, e.g., in the US? Specifically:
Why does saving remain positive in old age, even for most low income households? And what
explains the “German savings puzzle”, the puzzling fact that pensions and health insurance are
generous and likely to have large crowding out effects, yet German households accumulate so
much real and financial wealth and do not appear to draw it down?
We need a complicated answer to resolve this puzzle. We obviously need to distinguish be-
tween the older and the younger generation because they appear to save for different purposes.
Moreover, our data on the flat and positive savings in old age only pertain to the cohorts born
before the 1930s; we do not yet know whether that pattern will also hold for the younger gen-
11
eration.14 We then distinguish among three effects of public policies: effects on the level of
savings, essentially by crowding-out mechanisms mainly through social insurance; effects on
the life-cycle pattern of savings, flattening the age-savings profile; and effects on the portfolio
composition of savings, mainly through differential taxation.
Crowding-out effects of public pensions
We start with an analysis of the older generation in our data. Their members were born be-
tween 1910 and 1930 and they retired until about 1995 – this is today’s generation of German
retirees. Their current income is dominated by public pension income, much more so than in
the other countries in Table 1: 15
Table 1: Retirement Income by Pillar (Percentages)
About 85% of retirement income stems from the public mandatory retirement insurance, and
only 15% come from private sources such as funded firm pensions, individual retirement ac-
counts and other asset income, only a little remaining labor income and family transfers.
The international comparison in Table 1 suggests a strong substitution between the provision
of pay-as-you-go pensions and other income sources in old age. This crowding-out result is in
line with a careful time-series analysis of Kim (1992). He links changes in the retirement sys-
tem to the savings rate and shows that the German pay-as-you-go system has crowded out
saving to a significant extent. Cigno and Rosati (1996) confirm these findings but explain the
crowding-out effect unconventionally by repercussions on fertility rather than through the fa-
miliar channels stressed by Feldstein (1974).
The crowding-out result as it pertains to current retirement income is also at odds with the fact
that Germany has such a high saving rate, and in particular, that German elderly have real and
financial wealth levels that suffice for about 10 years of retirement income (cf. Figure 10). This
is of course the core of the “German savings puzzle”. We need three elements to explain it.
First, a part of the apparent contradiction between stocks of wealth (almost equally divided
between notional pension wealth and tangible real and financial wealth) on the one hand and
current income (85% pensions, 15% other income) on the other hand is resolved by realizing
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 We refer to the generation now aged between about age 30 and 50. There is also a third generation, the
“really young”, but we have little data on their saving and consumption habits.
15
 A survey of the German pension system is provided by Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998).
12
that Table 1 only reports current money income, not the imputed rent from homeownership,
and that most wealth held by the elderly is owner-occupied housing (cf. Figures 11 and 12).
Hence, table 1 exaggerates potential crowding-out effects. However, the omission of imputed
rent cannot fully explain the puzzle. The German homeownership rate is much lower than in
the Netherlands, the UK, and the US. For the generation born between 1910 and 1930, it is
just above 50 percent. 16  Moreover, flat and positive saving rates in old age are also prevalent
among elderly German renters (cf. Figure 2).
Schnabel (1999) provides the second element of our explanation. It is a story of ex ante versus
ex post savings plans. He shows that the growth of income during the German economic mira-
cle years and up to the seventies was so large and unprecedented that the elderly could just not
have anticipated it. Hence, they saved more than if they had known how miraculous a growth
rate they would experience.
Figure 14 displays the growth of earnings during the work history of a typical worker who
retired in 1970, the jump due to the 70% replacement rate after retirement, and then the subse-
quent increase in pension income due to gross indication. All numbers are in real terms. After
less than 10 years, the average worker had essentially recouped the former income level. The
process was only stopped in the early eighties, when economic growth slowed down to normal
also in Germany. Since such an income path could hardly be anticipated, workers consumed
too little and ended up with too large a stock of wealth around retirement.
Figure 14: Life-Cycle Income Path of the 1910 Cohort
While Schnabel’s (1999) story is plausible, it does not explain why this wealth has not been
spent at higher rates in old age. This is the third element of our explanation of the “German
savings puzzle.” First, they may be habit formation. The elderly do not want to change the ac-
customed level of consumption which they have learned some 50 years ago, not even increase
it in the face of accumulated financial wealth. There is some new evidence on the importance
of habit formation (JEconPerspect, 2000). Second, Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) provide a
complementary explanation. They argue that due to deteriorating health conditions, the elderly
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 This lower homeownership rate is only partially offset by the fact that the average home in Germany is more
expensive than in the Netherlands, the UK, and the US, see below.
13
are less able to spend as much as they would need to make saving negative. Both lines of ar-
gument are strengthened by capital market imperfections since annuitized pension income can-
not be borrowed against. Hence, even if the current generation of elderly had anticipated their
unwillingness or inability to draw down wealth at later ages, they could not have responded by
dissaving faster as long as their annuity income exceeds the planned consumption level.17
Life-cycle saving patterns
While the older generation may have had a retirement savings motive, but was surprised by the
high retirement income and could not draw the accumulated wealth down, the younger gen-
eration – now aged between about 30 and 50 years – has learned that retirement is not a time
of scarce resources. For them, the high replacement rates of the German public pension system
have made additional private retirement provision largely unnecessary. Saving for retirement,
the only motive under the pure life-cycle hypothesis, is of secondary importance. Other saving
motives dominate, most importantly saving for homeownership, as Figures 7 and 8 have
shown. In addition, there are motives such as high frequency precautionary saving, high fre-
quency saving for durables such as cars, and saving for intergenerational transfers. In fact, inter
vivos transfers are high in Germany and survey questions on savings motives show an almost
equal spread between the aforementioned saving motives.18
The mechanisms pertaining to both generations generate much flatter age-saving profiles than
under the retirement-saving oriented life-cycle hypothesis. The older generation still has posi-
tive saving rates because of the unwillingness or inability to draw down wealth at later ages
which they have accumulated in lack of anticipation of the spectacular economic growth. The
young generation has a flat saving profile because the slow process of owning a home and
short-frequency saving motives generate a flat saving rate over a long period.19
Hence, the generous public pension system in Germany appears to be the main cause for a
relatively flat age-saving profile. It has made the retirement savings motive relatively irrelevant
for the younger generation, and it has led to overannuitization among the elderly. We are
aware that this line of argument is vulnerable because it lacks a counterfactual. The interna-
tional comparisons in this journal issue do help in this respect. For instance, among the coun-
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 Which appeared to be the case, see Börsch-Supan (1992).
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 See Reil-Held (1999).
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 Conventional mortgages in Germany have a term of 30 years.
14
tries represented, the hump-shaped life-cycle savings pattern is most pronounced in the U.S.
where the replacement rate of the public pension systems is lower – and thus the retirement
savings motive is more important – than in continental Europe.
If a substantial portion of the saving patterns currently observed in Germany is caused by the
public pension system, we should expect substantial changes in saving patterns in the future.
Growth rates have declined and the dependency ratio is deteriorating rapidly. The current gen-
erosity of the social insurance system is unlikely to prevail. A major pension reform is under
way which will cut benefits substantially and, in effect, introduces more prefunding. This will
revive the retirement motive for saving. Hence, saving rates among the young are likely to in-
crease, and saving rates among the elderly are likely to decline sharply because the have to rely
more on their retirement savings to fiance consumption. We will have to wait for this counter-
factual to obtain a clearer explanation of what caused the puzzling German savings behavior.
Portfolio composition
Public policies appear also to have shaped the composition of tangible household wealth.20 As
pointed out in Section 3, the largest part is real estate, mainly owner-occupied housing. For the
group aged 30 to 59 this makes 80 to 90 percent of total wealth. While ownership rates are
lower than in most other European countries, the US and Japan, both land and housing con-
struction is relatively expensive in Germany. This paper is not the place to analyze why this is
so, but there is some evidence blaming restrictive land regulation.21 In addition, saving for
down payment in building societies is tax privileged.
Tax policy appears to have shaped the composition of financial wealth, displayed in Table 2.22
Table 2: Composition of Financial Household Wealth, 1978–1993
The most important component is whole life insurance, about a third of gross financial wealth.
The central reason for the important role of whole life insurance in German households life-
cycle savings decisions is its favorable tax treatment, as shown by Brunsbach and Lang (1998)
                                               
20
 For a detailed study of German household portfolio choice, see Börsch-Supan and Eymann (2000).
21
 Börsch-Supan, Kanemoto and Stahl (2001) claim that housing policies explain a significant share of the
price differences among Germany, Japan and the US, such as restrictive land development by local govern-
ments, excessive building codes and insufficient legislation to avoid monopolization of the construction indus-
try.
22
 A survey of tax policy in Germany is provided in the companion paper Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter,
Schnabel and Winter (2001).
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and Walliser and Winter (1999). Stocks and bonds are the second most important category.
Bonds make up the lions’ share in this category, while stocks are less than 10 percent of the
average household portfolio. This fact is also significant for financial markets, as life-insurance
companies have not been allowed to invest significantly in stocks in the past, which in turn is
one of the main reasons for thin capital markets in Germany. Stocks and bonds are tax privi-
leged in so far as capital gains are tax exempt if the underlying asset has been held for longer
than one year.23  The lenient taxation of capital income may be another explanation for the high
saving rate in Germany, but we are not aware of a reliable time series analysis that links the
level of tax relief to the aggregate household saving rate.
It is highly speculative how the portfolio composition in Table 2 would change in the wake of a
major change of the German social insurance system, notably a partial transition to prefunding
pensions. If there were no substitution between new retirement saving and current saving, the
household saving rate would increase by between 2 and 4 percent, see Birg and Börsch-Supan
(1999). If all of this would be channeled into pension funds, which only recently have been
introduced in Germany and still do not receive preferential tax treatment similar to whole life
insurance, pension funds would amount to between 15 and 18 percent of households’ portfo-
lios, comparable to the United Kingdom, the U.S., the Netherlands and Switzerland. Substitu-
tion between new retirement saving and current saving would increase this share, but part of
new retirement saving may also be done as whole life insurance. Households’ direct and indi-
rect exposure to stock markets then depends on future investment decisions of life insurance
companies who only recently began to increase their portfolio share of stocks. Judging from
the international experience in countries as diverse as the United Kingdom, the U.S., the Neth-
erlands and Switzerland, a more prominent role of equities seems very likely when more of the
German retirement income will be prefunded.
                                               
23
 This has recently been changed to two years.
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1Figure 1: Mean Discretionary Saving in 1978-1993
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Note: All data in prices of 1993 and weighted. Age/Cohort-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval.
 Source: Own calculations on the basis of the EVS 1978–1993.
Figure 2: Mean and Median Discretionary Saving in 1993
-6 ,000
-4 ,000
-2 ,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10 ,000
12 ,000
14 ,000
16 ,000
18 ,000
20 ,000
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Altersklassen
G
es
am
te
 E
rs
pa
rn
is
 in
 D
M
 im
 J
ah
r 1
99
3
75%
M itte l
M ed ian
25%
Note: All data in prices of 1993 and weighted. Age/Cohort-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the EVS 1978–1993.
2Figure 3: Mean Discretionary Saving by Two Different Definitions, 1993
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Note: All data in prices of 1993.  Age/Cohort-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the EVS 1978–1993.
Figure 4: Mean Discretionary Saving by Cohort
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Note: All data in prices of 1993. Age-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval. Source: Schnabel (1999)
3Figure 5: Median Saving Rates, 1993 Cross Section
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Note: All data in prices of 1993. Saving is defined as purchases minus sales of assets. Age/Cohort-groups
denoted by begin of 5-year interval.  Source: Own calculations on the basis of the EVS 1978–1993.
Figure 6: Median Saving Rates by Cohort
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4Figure 7: Mean Real Saving, 1978-1993
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Figure 8: Mean Financial Saving, 1978-1993
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Note: All data in prices of 1993 and weighted. Age/Cohort-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the EVS 1978–1993.
5Figure 9: Mean and Median Financial Saving in 1993
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Note: All data in prices of 1993 and weighted. Age/Cohort-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the EVS 1978–1993.
Figure 10: Mean Total Discretionary Wealth by Cohort
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Note: All data in prices of 1993. Age-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval.  Source: Schnabel (1999)
6Figure 11: Mean Gross Real Estate Wealth, 1978–1993
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Note: All data in prices of 1993 and weighted. Age/Cohort-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the EVS 1978–1993.
Figure 12: Mean Gross Financial Wealth, 1978–1993
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Note: All data in prices of 1993. Age/Cohort-groups denoted by begin of 5-year interval.  Source: Own
calculations on the basis of the EVS 1978–1993.
7Figure 13: Life-Cycle Build-up of Notional Pension Wealth
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Figure 14: Life-Cycle Income Path of the 1910 Cohort
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8Table 1: Retirement Income by Pillar (Percentages)
Germany The Netherlands Switzerland UK US
State 85% 50% 42% 65% 45%
Employer 5% 40% 32% 25% 13%
Individual 10% 10% 26% 10% 42%
Notes: Income composition of two-person households with at least one retired person. UK: „State“ includes
SERPS.  US: „Individual“ includes 25% earnings, much less in the other countries.
Source: Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (1998) and Disney, d’Ercole and Scherer (1998).
Table 2: Composition of Financial Household Wealth, 1978–1993
1978 1983 1988 1993 Share in
1993
 Savings accounts 15.534 12.224 13.287 11.120 17.5%
Building societies 6.225 5.957 4.998 4.744 7.5%
 Bonds and stocksa 7.430 8.957 10.381 19.948 31.4%
 Life insurance (cash value) 16.719 16.821 22.379 21.141 33.3%
 Other financial wealth - 1.811 1.784 6.614 10.4%
 Gross financial wealth 45.909 45.770 52.830 63.567 100.0%
 ./. Loans 23.043 28,859 30.266 35.055
 Net financial wealth 22.866 16.912 22.563 28.512
Note: Household data from the Einkommens- and Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS). All figures in DM and in 1993
prices. a) About 70% bonds and 30% stocks. For details see Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel
and Winter (2001).
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